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Hodkin: Insurer Insolvency: Problems & Solutions

NOTE

INSURER INSOLVENCY:
PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

When disaster strikes, modem America turns to insurance companies for shelter and compensation. Without insurance, everyday tragedies would be exacerbated by an inability to muster the funds necessary to start anew. Legal judgments would often be unenforceable
leaving the culpable party ruined and the injured party without effective recompense. Insurance has become a common remedy for the
uncommon occurrence,1 and often is crucial for those who can afford
it, transforming a bleak situation into one of hope and possibility.
Unfortunately, some persons who have put their faith into large
insurance companies have seen their dreams of security shattered. In
1990, forty-three nationwide insurers were declared insolvent by state
regulators.2 The fifty states, as regulators of the nation's insurance
companies, have found themselves with a burgeoning nightmare: due
to a combination of factors ranging from the real estate "slump" to
lower interest rates, multi-state insurers are no longer the stable economic powers they once were and are now struggling to survive.3 As
1. Americans spent $453 billion on all the various types of insurance in fiscal year
1989 alone. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., Insurance Industry: Questions and Concerns About
Solvency Regulation, GAO/T-GGD-91-10, at 1 (Feb. 27, 1991) [hereinafter Insurance Industry]
(statement of Johnny C. Finch, Director for Planning and Reporting, Testimony Before the
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate).
2. Insurance Information Institute, Insolvencies/Guaranty Funds, DATA BASE REP., Sept.
1991 (Ruth Gastel ed.), at 1 [hereinafter Insolvencies/Guaranty Funds]; see also Earl R.
Pomeroy, Slowing the Slide Toward Insolvency, 90 BEST'S REV. 16 (Jan. 1990) (stating that
the "[sitate insurance regulators are observing ominous signs of emerging insolvency").
3. Other factors contributing to the insolvency of insurance companies are: the "spiral-
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a result, a critical issue in the American insurance business has become the method of rehabilitating insurance companies on the brink
of insolvency. Proponents of the present system contend that the complexity and importance of the problems inherent in insurance company
insolvencies are the very reason that 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) 4 exempts
domestic insurance companies from the purview of the Bankruptcy
Code and relegates the rehabilitation and liquidation of domestic
insurance companies to the states.5 However, the inadequacies of
state regulation have caused Congress to consider eliminating the
insurance company exemption and to vest control over the regulation,
rehabilitation, and liquidation of insolvent insurers with the federal
government.6 This Note addresses the policies underlying the current
exemption of insolvent insurers from federal regulation and the prevailing practices of state regulatory agencies in rehabilitating and
liquidating insolvent insurers.

II. THE POLIciES
The Senate Judiciary Committee has justified the exclusion of
domestic insurance companies from the Bankruptcy Code by stating
that "[i]nsurance companies engaged in business in the United States
ing cost of [paying] claims," a lower profit margin on products, deficient loss reserves, rapid
growth and fraudulent administrators. Pomeroy, supra note 2, at 16. A General Accounting
Office Study has determined that the following factors contributed to the failure of several
large property/casualty insurers in the last few years: (1) multiple regulators; (2) expanding
markets; (3) excessive underpricing and minimal or poor underwriting of insurance; (4)
imprudent management; (5) infrequent fiscal examinations; (6) inadequate internal controls; (7)
insufficient loss reserves; (8) the adoption of precarious investment strategies; (9) obsolete
audit guidelines; and (10) an inability on the part of regulators to identify and respond to
insurers' financial problems. See U.S. GEN. ACcT. OFF., Property and Casualty Insurance:
Thrift Failures Provide Valuable Lessons, GAO/T-AFMD-89-7 (April 19, 1989) [hereinafter
Property and Casualty Insurance] (statement of Frederick D. Wolf, Assistant Comptroller
General, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives); see also Insurance Industry, supra note 1;
SUBCOMMrrrE-

ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION, HousE COMMITrEE ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., FAILED PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES
70 (Comm. Print 1990).
4. Section 109(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "[a] person may be a debtor
under chapter 7 of this title only if such person is not .
a domestic insurance company ... " 1t U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (1991).
Section 109(d) provides that "[o]nly a person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 of
this title . . . may be a debtor under chapter 11 of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1991).
Therefore, the liquidation and rehabilitation of domestic insurance companies is beyond the
scope of the Bankruptcy Code.
5. See infra notes 6-24 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., S. 1644, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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are excluded from liquidation under the bankruptcy laws because they
are bodies for which alternate provision is made for their liquidation
under various State or Federal regulatory laws." 7 Although
conclusory, this rationale has been adopted by many authorities, primarily because it is the only statement of congressional intent in this
area.' However, it does not explain the disparate treatment of domestic insurance companies and other debtors who are also regulated by
the states but whose liquidation and rehabilitation is now executed
within the confines of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth a more satisfying
rationale in Sims v. Fidelity Assurance Ass'n.9 Fidelity, a multi-state
investment company incorporated in 1911, sold annuities throughout
its corporate life until 1940.10 At that time, Fidelity revised its corporate charter in order to enter the life insurance business.' Fidelity
sold insurance for four months after the charter revision, but was then
ordered to cease selling its policies by the State Insurance Commissioner. 2 Fidelity subsequently filed a petition alleging insolvency
and sought to reorganize as a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act.13

7. Notes of the Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5817 & 6275; see also H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 318 (1977).
The Supreme Court has held that Congressional power to regulate the insurance
industry stems from the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
8. See, e.g., Sims v. Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, 129 F.2d 442, 448 (4th Cir. 1942), aft'd,
318 U.S. 608 (1943); In re Supreme Lodge of the Masons Annuity, 286 F. 180, 184 (N.D.
Ga. 1923); In re Florida Brethren Homes, Inc., 88 B.R. 445, 447 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988);
Southern Indus. Banking Corp. v. Anderson, 59 B.R. 978, 986 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986);
Portland Metro Health, Inc. v. Driscoll, 15 B.R. 102, 104 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981). See generally DAVID L. BUCHBINDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY: A LAWYERS GUIDE § 5.6, at 89
(1991) [hereinafter BUCHBINDER]; BEtNAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY
LAW MANUAL
1.03[6], at 1-16 (2d ed. 1986).
9. 129 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1942), aft'd, 318 U.S. 608 (1943).
10. Id at 445.
11. Id at 446-47.
12. Id at 447.
13. Id The applicable provision of the Bankruptcy Act which prevented domestic
insurance companies from filing for bankruptcy was 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1910) (repealed 1978).
That provision read:
Section 4. Who May Become Bankrupts.
(a) Any person, except [an] . . . insurance . . . corporation . . . shall be entitled
to the benefits of this Act as a voluntary bankrupt.
(b) . . . and any moneyed, business, or commercial corporation except [an]
insurance . . . corporation . . .may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt.
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The district court approved the petition and enjoined the state officials
who were otherwise to preside over the liquidation from disposing of
the insurer's property and ordered the state to deposit with-the bankruptcy trustee all assets that were under the state's control.1 4
In finding that Fidelity was a "domestic insurance company"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, the court provided a detailed analysis of the policies underlying § 109(b)(2). The broad purpose of the exclusion, the court stated, "may be surmised to lie in the
public or quasi public nature of the business, involving other interests
than those of creditors, in the desirability of unarrested operation, the,
completeness of state regulation, including provisions for insolvency,
and the inappropriateness of the bankruptcy machinery to their affairs." 5 Moreover, the following specific policies were said to support the exclusion:
(1) Judicial Economy. The court noted that insurance companies
are likely to have "a variety of insurance obligations" and that many,
if not all, of the policy holders and creditors would seek to be represented during the pendency of the bankruptcy. 16 Furthermore, the
various claims would have to be examined for authenticity and accuracy, a problem "requiring much time and elaborate accounting for its
solution" and perhaps, depending upon the size of the case, drawing
out the proceedings for years.' 7 While a similar situation might arise
whenever a large corporation declares bankruptcy, it is a certainty in
the case of insurance companies. Therefore, rather than burdening
federal courts with protracted cases, Congress believed that justice and
the interests of creditors would be best served by allowing the states
to administer insurer insolvencies.
(2) Ease of Administration. In addition to having to contend with
a large class of potential creditors, insurance companies are subject to
numerous laws and regulations. All fifty states, as well as several
territories, have statutes that govern the insurance companies within

14. Sims, 129 F.2d at 447.
15. Id. at 448-49 (quoting In re Supreme Lodge of Masons Annuity, 286 F. 180, 184
(N.D.Ga. 1923)); see also Portland Metro Health, Inc. v. Driscoll, 15 B.R. 102, 104 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1981).
16. Sims, 129 F.2d at 449; see also BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 89 ("iThere are a
myriad of issues arising [in the case of insolvent insurance companies] that are too complex
and unusual to be considered within the purview of the bankruptcy system. For example,
there are the rights of the policy holders; the rights of the claim holders, and the rights of
the shareholders and other general creditors. Separate regulation pays more careful attention to
these precise relationships.").
17. Sims, 129 F.2d at 449.
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their respective boundaries."8 The states also provide for guaranty
funds whereby solvent insurers pay the claims of insolvent or rehabilitating insurers. 9 Thus, states have a vested interest in an insurer's
solvency and in ensuring that the integrity and technical accuracy of
insolvency proceedings are protected. If a domestic insurance company is declared insolvent, every state whose guaranty fund is threatened is likely to seek representation in the bankruptcy proceedings,
lengthening the case and perhaps confusing the issues.2" Permitting
the states to oversee their own portion of insolvency proceedings
prevents bankruptcy courts from having to learn the precise and technical laws of several states simultaneously. 2' As the Sims court noted, "it would be a ruinous thing to the state, to the depositors, and to
the creditors to have the elaborate [regulatory and insolvency
schemes] which the state provides broken into and nullified by bankruptcy proceedings ....
22
(3) The States' Interest in Protecting the Public Interest. Insurance companies are "affected with a public interest" 23 because individuals who deal with them are generally at an economic disadvantage. Therefore, the courts have concluded that "since the states commonly kept supervision over [the insurance companies] during their
lives, it [is] reasonable that they should take charge on their demise.

24

Thus, it is clear that when Congress enacted § 109(b)(2), there
were many apparently sound reasons for doing so. Nevertheless, in
order to obtain the protection of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, entities
that appeared to fit under the § 109(b)(2) insurance company exclusion argued that they were not the type of entity that § 109(b)(2) was

18. See infra note 78. The list found therein is representative, not exhaustive.
19. See, e.g., Insolvencies/Guaranty Funds, supra note 2 and infra notes 91-98 and
accompanying text.
20. LSee Sims, 129 F.2d at 449. The court specifically stated that "it was intended by
[Congress that by] withdrawing jurisdiction over these corporations from the bankruptcy
court . . . that this would not occur." Id
21. "The affairs of an embarrassed or insolvent insurance company often require much
technical skill and judgment and time for their adjustment and a carrying forward of the
business, to prevent lapses and to permit reinsurance to simplify them." Id
22. Sims, 129 F.2d at 449; see also Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. O'Connor, 95
F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1938); Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1934).
23. Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., v. South Carolina, 27 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1928).
24. Sims, 129 F.2d at 449; see also In re Portland Metro Health, Inc., 15 B.R. 102,
104 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981) (insurance companies affect "the interest of the public at large");
First American Bank & Trust Co. v. Gerge, 540 F.2d 343 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1011 (1976).
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meant to encompass. In other words, they argued that they were not
domestic insurance companies.

M.

WHAT IS A DoMESTIC INSURANCE COMPANY?

At its most fundamental level, an insurance company "is a company or corporation engaged in making contracts" by which it "assumes particular risks of the other party and promises to pay ... a
sum of money on a specified contingency." 25 Engaging in such a
business-also defined as the "spreading and underwriting of a
policyholder's risk"2 6-for any length of time may place an entity
within the scope of section 109(b)(2). 27 However, even if an entity
has engaged in the business of insurance, if "the element of insurance
is but incidental" to the business predominantly engaged in, the entity
may not be "an 'insurance company' within the meaning of that
phrase as it is commonly used and understood. 2 8
Furthermore, "insurance companies" are not the only entities
engaged in the type of business defined above. For example, health
maintenance organizations have been a frequent subject of litigation
centering on the issue of what constitutes a domestic insurance company. In order to effectively deal with this issue, courts have formulated three additional tests which determine whether an entity is a
domestic insurance company. These are: (1) the "state-classification"
test; (2) the "independent classification" test; and (3) the "alternative

25. 44 CJ.S. Insurance §§ 1, 91 (1988); see also Portland Metro, 15 B.R. at 104 ("[an
insurer evaluates] and spread[s] . . .an individual's risk of incurring . . . expenses among a
large group." Its rates are determined by projecting a subscriber's "risk factor" with the goal
of reducing the company's risk factor).
The United States Supreme Court has defined insurance as "the act of insuring, or
assuring, against loss or damage by a contingent event; a contract whereby, for a stipulated
consideration . . . one party undertakes to indemnify or guarantee another against loss by a
certain specified contingency or peril, called a risk, the contract being set forth in a document called the policy." Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
211, reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979), and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985) (quoting
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcIoNARY oF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (2d
ed. 1958)); see also Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
26. Portland Metro, 15 B.R. at 105 (quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal
Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979)).
27. See Sims, 129 F.2d at 442. As indicated above, even a company which engaged in
the business of insurance for a mere 4 months was determined to fall within the scope of §
109(b)(2). See supra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
28. In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 56 S. Ct. 248 (1935)
(The debtor's principal business was making and selling mortgages. The debtor guaranteed
the payment of the mortgages sold to third parties, and was therefore held not to be an
insurance company within the meaning of § 22 of the Bankruptcy Act).
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relief" test.
SA.

The State Classification Test

The state classification test allows courts to characterize debtors
as insurance companies if the state of the debtor's incorporation so
views the debtor.2 9 The state's classification is considered important
because "[w]hen Congress excepted not all companies affected with a
public interest, but specified kinds of such compan[ies], presumably it
intended the states to define the kinds."3 ' If a state's statutory
scheme classifies a debtor as an insurance company, the debtor may
be deemed excluded from
the Bankruptcy Code by § 109(b)(2). 3 1 If
32
the statute is ambiguous,

the court will more closely examine the substance of the statute,
especially the powers given [the entity] under the statutory scheme.
In some instances, a comprehensive statutory liquidation scheme
may indicate that the corporation is to be excluded from the reach
of the Bankruptcy Code, although statutory provision for state supervised liquidation does not necessarily bring a corporation within the
exclusionary language of § 109. If an examination of the state statute indicates that the state does not equate the [entity] in question
with corporations in the excluded class, the [entity] is a proper
33
debtor.

In order to further clarify the issue, the test requires courts to
take into consideration a number of factors, including: (1) The extent
to which actions taken by the debtor in the due course of business

29. Cash Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Shine, 37 B.R. 617, 621 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984),
aft'd, 762 F.2d 542 (7th Cir.), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904 (1985); see also Gamble v.
Daniel, 39 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 281 U.S. 705, and cert. denied, 282 U.S.
848 (1930).
30. Prudence, 79 F.2d at 79 (quoting Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., 75 F.2d 984
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935)). Contra In re Colorado Indus. Bank of Fort
Collins, 84 B.R. 735, 738 n.2 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) ("Mhe court is convinced that the
"state classification test' is inappropriate for determining jurisdiction because its utilization
would result in an abdication of a federal court's responsibility to interpret federal law. No
state scheme can override Congress's own intention as to who should be eligible for bankruptcy relief and the mere fact that a debtor is an [insurance company] as defined by state
law is not dispositive of the issue of federal jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Code.").
31. ld.; see also Southern Indus. Banking Co. v. Anderson, 59 B.R. 978 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1986); Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1930).
32. It is often the case with statutes concerning health maintenance organizations that
their classification under state law is ambiguous. See infra notes 58-77 and accompanying
text.
33. Cash Currency, 37 B.R. at 621.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:727

are similar to actions of entities which are "clearly exempted under §
109(b)(2);"' (2) The amount and quality of state regulation over the
debtor, including the existence of statutory provisions concerning the
liquidation of the debtor;35 and (3) The "public or quasi-public" nature of the debtor's business.3 6
The "state classification test" alone is not determinative of
whether a debtor is an insurance company. Several courts have expressly disavowed the test as being dispositive of the issue, stating
that the test should merely be a "predominating influence., 37 The
primary reason seems to be that "the 'state classification test' [is]
somewhat illusory, for no State scheme [can] override Congress' own
38
intention as to who should be eligible for bankruptcy relief.,
Therefore, the formulation of other tests has been necessary.

34. Southern Indus. Banking, 59 B.R. at 982. This aspect of the test is also known as
"functional analysis." See In re Family Health Services, Inc., 101 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1989).
35. Southern Indus. Banking, 59 B.R. at 982. The court stated that "[a] significant
factor . . . in applying the state classification test is whether the state provides a specific
liquidation scheme. [citations omitted] The more comprehensive the liquidation scheme, the
stronger the indication that the state sees a strong public interest in direct governmental
supervision and control of the liquidation or dissolution of the institution." Id at 984; see
also Cash Currency, 37 B.R. at 621; Portland Metro Health, 15 B.R. at 104.
36. Southern Indus. Banking, 59 B.R. at 982; see also Portland Metro, 15 B.R. at 104;
First American Bank & Trust, 540 F.2d at 349; In re Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd., 401
F. Supp. 1159, 1170-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.),
and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976).
37. In fact, the Sims court stated that "[t]he scope of the provision by which...
insurance . . .corporations are excepted from Bankruptcy proceedings is to be determined in
any case by the classification of the corporation under the law of the state of its creation
rather than by the character of its predominant business activity," Sims, 129 F.2d at 448, but
that "the classification of a state statute [need not] be followed literally in every instance
without any regard whatsoever to the real activity of the corporate body." Id at 451; see
also First American Bank & Trust, 540 F.2d at 346 ("The utilization of the incorporating
state's classification of the corporation does not mean that state law will be followed literally
without regard to an assessment of the actual operation of the petitioning corporation."); Cash
Currency, 37 B.R. at 621 n.3; In re Morris Plan Co. of Iowa, 62 B.R. 348, 353 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1986).
Collier agrees with this view, stating that although the state classification test "is more
favored by the courts, this does not mean that state law is followed literally without regard
for the real activities of the corporation, particularly where the corporation has failed to
utilize its charter or has developed into a different kind of corporation." 2 COLLIER ON
109.02, at 109-14 (15th Ed. 1985).
BANKRUPTCY
38. In re Republic Trust & Savings Co., 59 B.R. 606, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986),
appeal denied, 77 B.R. 282 (N.D. Okl. 1987); see also Cola. Indus. Bank of Fort Collins, 84
B.R. at 738-39 n.2 ("The creation of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is statutory and
constitutional; as such jurisdiction does not depend on what a state court or a state legislative
scheme might or might not do under certain circumstances.").
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B.

The Independent Classification Test

Under the "independent classification test," the language of the
Bankruptcy Code must be construed in order to determine if the
debtor falls within the scope of the statute.39 This rule was adopted
by the Illinois bankruptcy court in Cash Currency Exchange, Inc. v.
Shine4" as the predominant rule in determining the scope of the
§109(b)(2) exclusions, to the disavowal
of the "state classification
42
test"41 and the "alternative relief test."
In interpreting the language of §109(b)(2), the Cash Currency
court observed that aside from a limited number of specific exclusions, the Bankruptcy Code's inclusion of debtors is fairly broad.43
The general rule of statutory construction requires that where a statute
delineates specific exclusions, the statute otherwise applies to all
entities not specifically excluded.' Thus, statutes that specifically
exclude entities from their scope are considered exhaustive, not illustrative.45 Moreover, statutory provisions should be construed so as to
give effect to their plain meaning. 46 Therefore, under the "independent classification test," the court will merely look to whether the
debtor in question fulfills the functions and has the powers understood to be those exercised by entities normally fitting the definition
of insurance companies.47
C.

The Alternative Relief Test

The "alternative relief test," a relatively new test4' for determin39. See Cash Currency, 37 B.R. at 621; see also Southern Industrial Banking Co., 59
B.R. at 985 (-The independent classification test determines the status of an entity solely
under an interpretation of the language of § 109(b)(2)."); Family Health Services, Inc., 101
B.R. at 621; 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
109.02 (15th Ed. 1989).
40. 37 B.R. 617, 621 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1984), af'd, 762 F.2d 542 (7th Cir.), and cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 904 (1985).
41. See In re Colorado Indus. Bank of Fort Collins, 84 B.R. 735, 739 n.2 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1988); see also supra note 30.
42. Seg infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
43. Cash Currency, 37 B.R. at 625.
44. See Cash Currency, 37 B.R. at 625-26; Colorado Indus. Bank, 84 B.R. at 739; In
re Morris Plan Co. of Iowa, 62 B.R. 348, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); In re Central
Mortgage & Trust, Inc., 50 B.R. 1010, 1019-20 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985); 2A SUT ERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (1973 & Supp. 1983).
45. See Cash Currency, 37 B.R. at 626; Colorado Indus. Bank, 84 B.R. at 739.
46. See Cash Currency, 37 B.R. at 626; Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir.),
appeal dismissed, 281 U.S. 705, and cert. denied, 282 U.S. 848 (1930).
47. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
48. Actually, the test has been used by previous courts as an aid to applying the state
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ing whether a debtor is excluded from § 109(b)(2), is "a policy based
analysis"4' 9 which permits courts to exercise the broad discretion
vested within them by Congress "to serve the purpose and intent of
the Bankruptcy Code.""0 The test enables courts to be flexible rather
than compelling them to adhere to the comparatively rigid state and
independent classification tests when evaluating the applicability of §
109(b)(2) to a debtor. "In general, 'courts should consider whether a
bankruptcy proceeding is a satisfactory method, compared with availmethods, of reorganizing or
able State and Federal non-bankruptcy
51
liquidating a would-be debtor."'
The alternative relief test obviously allows a court to be relatively subjective in its analysis of the applicability of § 109(b)(2). The
test has been the subject of both praise52 and criticism, the latter
most notable in In re Beacon Health Services.53 In Beacon, the court
found that the alternative relief test was "irrelevant" when applied to
a debtor that engages in business in only one state. Bankruptcy Judge
James E. Yacos wrote:
[i]n legislating the exception to federal bankruptcy relief, Congress
said in effect if an entity is an 'insurance company' there is no
federal relief regardless of any considerations of comparable effectiveness of the state and federal procedures. A bankruptcy court is
not authorized ... to ignore the command of § 109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code just because it believes relief in its court will be more
effective.54
The court then expressed the belief that the alternative relief test
might be appropriate where there are "numerous states involved, [and]

classification and independent classification tests. See, e.g., Sims, 129 F.2d at 442. What is
new is its classification as an independent test. In re Family Health Services, Inc., 101 B.R.
628 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) has expressly recognized this third category; see also In re
Republic Trust & Savings Co., 59 B.R. 606, 611 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986).
49. Family Health Services, 101 B.R. at 626.
50. Id; see also 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
4.05[2], at 593 (14th ed. 1975).
51. Family Health Services, 101 B.R. at 626 (quoting Republic Trust, 59 B.R. at 614).
52. See, e.g., Republic Trust, 59 B.R. at 611; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 4.05[2], at
593 (14th ed. 1975). Though neither source labeled the test as one of "alternative relief," the
court disparaged both the "state classification test" and the "independent classification testand then cited Collier for the proposition that "courts [are] free to take a 'reasonable and
flexible approach' to the matter of eligibility for bankruptcy relief and 'should be guided
largely by the question of whether a bankruptcy proceeding is a satisfactory method of
liquidating the [entity] under consideration.'" See also In re Guaranty Trust Company, No.
BK-78-02019 (W.D. Okla. Filed March 6, 1979).
53. 105 B.R. 178 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989).

54. Id at 185.
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it arguably might be difficult for the entities to get effective, coordinated relief in the individual states."55 The court added, however,
that it did "not find the underlying rationale [for the alternative relief
test] compelling in any event, i.e., the fact of numerous states involved as being determinative5 6 as to whether an entity is within the
exclusions of section 109(b)."
Indeed, the bankruptcy of a multi-state debtor that could clearly
be classified as an "insurance company" under § 109(b)(2) might be
expedited if in federal bankruptcy court under the purview of the
Bankruptcy Code. However, absent a statutory amendment such a
result would be devoid of statutory or constitutional authority, would
directly contradict a command of Congress, and therefore would be
void. Nevertheless, where there is some question as to whether an
entity is an insurance company, the alternative relief test-if used in
conjunction with the "state classification" and "independent classification" tests-may be helpful in resolving the question.
D. Applying the Tests
In In re Portland Metro,58 the debtor, an Oregon "health maintenance organization," sought to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The court, using the "state classification test,"
found that the debtor was an "insurance company" for the purposes
of determining whether the debtor fell within the scope of §
109(b)(2).5 9 Citing Sims, the court concluded that "state law classification of the debtor as an insurance company rather than the predominant or any single activity of the debtor, which may include noninsurance activities, is ...
the primary test of insurance."' The
court also noted that entities which are classified as insurance companies always have several elements in common: (1) They are extensively regulated by well-organized departments of the State and of the
United States; (2) they are subject to express statutory procedures for
non-bankruptcy liquidation; (3) the nature of their business is public

55. Id
56. Id at 186.
57. See Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353 (1920) ("Courts
are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond the power delegated to them. If they
act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are
rendered as nullities.").
58. 15 B.R. 102 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981).
59. Id at 104.
60. d
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or quasi-public and involve interests other than those of creditors.61
The court observed that the Oregon State Insurance Commissioner was engaged in regulating the debtor on a daily basis, and had the
power to supervise the liquidation of the company.6 2 Moreover, the
debtor was subject to regulation "as a health maintenance organization
by the Federal Department of Health and Human Services."'63 The
court did not recognize the apparent incongruity of that statement: the
debtor was viewed and regulated by the Department of Health and
Human Services as a "health maintenance organization," and yet the
court cited that fact as indicative of the debtor's being an insurance
company. The court focused on the fact that because "regulation"
existed-regardless of the characterization of the regulation by the
administering agency-the debtor fulfilled the requirement that it be
of "public or quasi-public nature." However, the court acknowledged
the federal regulation even though by doing so the court undermined
its finding that the entity was subject to comprehensive regulation as
an insurance company. The incompatibility of the two positions was
never acknowledged by the PortlandMetro Court, but may be indicative of why other courts have not adopted Portland Metro's conclusions.
The court provided several other reasons supporting its conclusion that Portland Metro was an .insurance company. The court remarked that the organization's subscribers viewed it as an insurance
company,' and pointed out the parallels between Portland Metro's
operation and other, more typical insurance companies. Also, Portland
Metro's
relationship with its survivors begins with the evaluation and spreading of an individual's risk of incurring medical expenses among a
large group. The [plaintiff's] subscriber rates are determined based
upon a projected risk factor... with the goal of minimizing [the
plaintiff's] exposure to loss .... [The plaintiff] reinsures its excess

liability with another carrier.'
Finally, the court concluded that "[t]he fact that the debtor arranges
for medical services by contracting directly with providers rather than
by indemnifying subscribers only focuses on the debtor's means of

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

IR

Id
Id (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300e-11).
Id
Id at 104-05.
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accomplishing its objectives but does not detract from its purpose and
character as an insurance company. " '
Conversely, several courts have found that health maintenance
organizations are not "domestic insurance companies." Foremost
among them is the Central District of California Bankruptcy Court,
which decided a series of cases in 1989 under the name In re Family
Health Services, Inc.67 The cases involved forty-eight related health
maintenance organizations in seven different states, 100,000 creditors,
and 600,000 plan members with claims against the organization.68
The Family Health plan members paid a monthly fee allowing
them to take advantage of hospitals and doctors, regardless of the
medical situation, at a reduced cost.69 Although the debtor was regulated by the Texas State Board of Insurance, it was authorized by the
Board to do business only as a health maintenance organization. 0
Moreover, the debtor's articles of incorporation stated that the
debtor's purpose was to "plan, develop and operate a health maintenance organization." ' Finally, the Texas statute drew a distinction
between "insurance companies" and "health maintenance organizations." An insurance company was defined as "a corporation doing a
business involving payment of money conditioned upon loss due to
sickness or health., 72 Health maintenance organizations are defined
as "any person who arranges for or provides a health care plan...
to enrollees on a prepaid basis."73
The court also emphasized the difference between health maintenance organizations and insurance companies. The court observed that
health maintenance companies provide services, whereas insurance

66. Id at 105.
67. 101 B.R. 618 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989). Related cases dealing with other aspects of
the entity called "MaxiCare" may be found, under the identical name of In re Family Health
Services, Inc., 101 B.R. 628 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989); 101 B.R. 636 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989);
104 B.R. 268 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989); 104 B.R. 279 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989); 105 B.R. 937
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989), vacated on separate grounds, 130 B.R. 314 (9th Cir. 1991). These
cases all remain within the judicial system. The case at 101 B.R. 618 [hereinafter Family
Health] is considered representative, and will be used for this discussion.
68. See Family Health, 101 B.R. at 619; In re Family Health Services, Inc., 130 B.R.
314 (9th Cir. 1991). The corporation had approximately one million members prior to filing
for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
69. See Family Health, 101 B.R. at 619.
70. Id at 623.
71. Id
72. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 3.01(3) (West 1981).
73. Family Health, 101 B.R. at 623; see also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.02(j) (West
Supp. 1989).
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companies reimburse for services previously or currently being rendered.74 A health maintenance organization, the court found, merely
controlled costs, and did not act to reimburse costs, and thus was not
an insurance company.75
Another prominent health maintenance organization case that
conflicts with the Portland Metro holding is In re Michigan Master
Health Plan, Inc. 76 The state statute provided for regulation by the
"insurance bureau" but, as was the case in Family Health Services,
drew a distinction between health maintenance organizations and
insurance companies. Relying upon this statutory scheme and the
"independent classification test," the court found that health maintenance organizations are essentially "medical clinics," and not insurance companies within the meaning of § 109(b)(2). 7
Portland Metro, Family Health Services and Michigan Master
Health Plan all aptly illustrate one of the problems posed by the
various tests and classifications of debtors used to determine the
applicability of § 109(b). Under the current system, entities, policyholders and plan participants are not treated equally from state to
state. This is true, of course, of many entities in many fields. Yet in
this situation, it is not enough to allow an entity to live and die by
the laws of the state in which it has knowingly incorporated, or does
business, because there are innocent policyholders and creditors involved. More often than not, policyholders will not be well versed in
the complexities of the law, or the significance of the insolvency laws
of their state or of the state where the entity is incorporated. Conversely, policyholders could be said to have constructive knowledge
of the laws of their jurisdiction and of the company they contract
with for medical or insurance services. But the problem goes beyond
that.
In re Family Health Services demonstrates the 'real difficulty with
§ 109(b) and the current system of testing entities for inclusion under
§ 109(b). The insolvency of a multi-state insurer is governed by the
laws of the states in which its subdivisions are incorporated. Yet, if
those states provide a different classification for entities that perform
the same function-as was provided by Texas and Oregon for the

74.
75.
(1979).
76.
77.

Family Health, 101 B.R. at 623.
Id at 624; accord Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S., 205
90 B.R. 274 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985).
id at 277.
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health maintenance organizations in In re Family Health Services and
In re Portland Metro Health-then policyholders in the same company, purchasing what is essentially the same product, may receive
widely disparate remedies in the event of an insolvency. Such a result-perhaps a full reimbursement for policyholders in one state, and
nothing for policyholders in another-is patently inequitable and
should not .be permitted.
At this level, the simplest solution would be for Congress either
to define a "domestic insurance company," or to include questionable
entities within the scope of § 109(b)(2). Yet the discrepancy amongst
the states is only one of the problems facing the current rehabilitation
and liquidation system. The real difficulties lie, not in the disparities,
but in the inadequacies of the states as regulators.
IV.

THE DEATH OF AN INSURER

The insolvency laws of the several states are designed to ensure
that, upon dissolution, an insurer's policyholders will not be left without a remedy in the event of disaster.7 s The process, replete with
regulatory safeguards, is inundated with incompetency, inadequacy,
and inequity. This section of the Note examines the process and
problems of the current system.79
A.

Regulatory Agencies

The state regulatory agencies, which oversee domestic insurance
companies, rely upon various monitoring tools in order to ensure that
insurance companies under their supervision remain able to pay their
claims. The National Association of Insurance Companies ("NAIC")
has created the Insurance Regulatory Information System ("IRIS") in
order to identify insurance companies experiencing financial difficul-

78. The "UNmFoRM INsuaREs LIQUIDATION ACT," 13 U.L.A. 328 (Master ed. West Supp.
1992), has been adopted by the following states and territories: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Virgin Islands, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 13 U.L.A. 32127. The remaining 18 states have adopted independently formulated regulatory statutes.
79. For purposes of this discussion, the insolvency laws of New York and Florida will
be examined with particularity. The fact that both states have adopted the Uniform Insurers
Liquidation Act, see supra note 78, will highlight the differences between their statutory
schemes.
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ty.8° The system requires insurers to file annual financial statements
with state regulators and to allow regulators to conduct on-site examinations." The insurer's financial strength in thirty categories is measured solely by means of the information contained within the financial statement.8 2 If the test "indicates that a company's financial ratios are outside the normal range in more than four areas, its finances
are reviewed in greater detail to
determine whether it is in need of
83
immediate regulatory attention.,
The IRIS system has been criticized on several grounds. Insurerprepared financial statements are often unverified and stale. 4 The
statements are not reviewed by state regulators until several months
after the close of the insurer's fiscal year, and problems may not be
discovered for up to eighteen months after their inception.8 5 The
problem has been aggravated by inadequate funding and manpower,
which prevents state regulators from discovering problems as quickly
as possible. 6 Moreover, many state insurance departments rely upon
examiners who do not meet NAIC standards.8 7
The NAIC has commanded state insurers to share information
regarding the health of multi-state insurers during insolvencies and

80. See Insolvencies/Guaranty Funds, supra note 2, at 9-10.
81. Id at 10; see also U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, INSURANCE REGULATION: PROBLEMS IN
THE STATE MONITORING OF PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURER SOLVENCY, GAO/GGD-89-129
(Sept. 29, 1989) [hereinafer INSURANCE REGULATION].
82. INSURANCE REGULATION, supra note 81.
83. Insolvencies/Guaranty Funds, supra note 2, at 10.
84. See U.S. GEN. ACcT. OFFICE, INSURANCE REGULATION: THE INSURANCE REGULATORY INFORMATION SYSTEM NEEDS IMPROVEMENT, GAO/GGD-91-20, at 23 (Nov. 21,
1990).
85. Id, at 24; see also U.S. GEN. ACcT. OFFICE, INSURANCE REGULATION: STATE HANDLING OF FINANCIALLY TROUBLED PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURERS, GAO/GGD-91-92, at 3
(May 21, 1991) [hereinafter FINANCIALLY TROUBLED INSURERS] (resulting in "insurance regulators [being] typically late in taking formal action against financially troubled companies.
State regulators did not take formal action in 71 percent of failed insurer cases . . . until the
insurers became insolvent or later").
Moreover, state regulators have been accused of having a "live and let live" philosophy, blocking needed reforms and permitting insurance companies to remain largely unchecked on the state level. See Michael S. Dukakis, Legislators Look at Proposed Changes,
In CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 222, 225 (Robert E. Keeton et al. eds., 1968); see also JOHN
G. DAY, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 59-60 (1970).
86. FINANCIALLY TROUBLED INSURERS, supra note 85, at 33 ("Since 1989, NAIC has
increased both staff and computer facilities to improve collection and analysis of financial and
other data on insurance companies.").
87. Id, Though examiners are supposed to be certified as an Accredited Financial
Examiner or a Certified Financial Examiner by the National Society of Financial Examiners,
some of the examiners in 35 states did not fulfill either requirement.
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inform other states whenever an' insurer appears to be encountering
financial difficulty.88 However, the states are often slow to do so, if
at all.8 9 The result is that regulators in one state may not be aware
that a "branch" of a multi-state insurer is in danger of requiring rehabilitation or liquidation until insolvency has been declared. Upon
discovering that an insurer is in danger of beconing insolvent, the
various states generally follow the procedures outlined in Part C of
this Note.90
B.

Guaranty Funds

In order to protect policyholders, every state-as well as the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico-has a "guaranty fund" which
is used to help solvent insurers absorb the losses caused to claimants
by insolvent insurers.91 In 1990, state guaranty funds contained an
excess of nearly $2 billion after paying all claims filed due to insol-

88. See, e.g., Insurance Industry, supra note 1, at 1; U.S. GaN. AccT. OFF., Insurance
Regulation: Assessment of the National Association of the Insurance Commissioners, GAOiTGGD-91-37 (May 22, 1991) (statement of Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy
and Commerce, House of Representatives).
89. See id.
90. See infra notes 99-126 and accompanying text.
91. See Insolvencies/GuarantyFunds, supra note 2, at 12-14. In addition, many insurers
acquire "excess" insurance from other carriers in order to protect the insurer from excessive
liability. The liability of the excess insurer remains intact, despite the insolvency of the
primary insurer. However, the excess insurer's liability remains secondary to the liability of
the primary insurer. Accordingly, the excess insurer does not have to pay the full amount of
a claim against an insolvent primary insurer, but remains responsible only for the amount of
the claim in excess of the primary insurer's liability, regardless of the ability of the insured
to gain compensation from the primary insurer.
For example, assume a disallowed claim against an insolvent primary insurer in the
amount of $2,050,000, and an excess insurer which has contracted to pay claims against the
primary insurer in excess of $2,000,000. Despite the insured's inability to recover against the
primary insurer, the excess insurer remains responsible for paying the amount of the claim
exceeding $2,000,000. Therefore, the insured has an enforceable claim for $50,000 against the
excess insurer. See, e.g., Zurich Insurance Co. v. Hell Co., 815 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.
1987); Pergament Distributors, Inc. v. Old Republic Insurance Co., 513 N.Y.S.2d 467 (App.
Div.), appeal denied, 514 N.E.2d 389 (N.Y. 1987); American Re-Insurance Co. v. SGB
Universal Builders Supply, Inc., 532 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1988). Cf. Gulezian v. Lincoln
Insurance Co., 506 N.E.2d 123 (Mass. 1987) (the excess insurer is considered to "drop
down" to first dollar coverage for the primary insurer, and in the above hypothetical would
be responsible for the full $2,050,000 claim against the primary insurer); see also Mass.
Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Continental Casualty Co., 506 N.E.2d 118 (Mass. 1987) (holding
that if the primary insurer's obligation is unenforceable by the insured, "the excess policy in
effect provides first dollar coverager to the insured); infra notes 127-36 and accompanying
texL
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vencies.' With the exception of New York, all states require their
insurers to contribute to the fund subsequent to an. insolvency, at
which time they are assessed a prorated portion of the amounts necessary to maintain the fund.93 New York has a "pre-insolvency" fund
wherein all solvent insurers contribute to the fund so that it always
maintains a balance between $150 million and $200 million. 9' The
New York system is being studied by several states, because it is
more effective than most: the money is present prior to insolvency,
thereby preventing the possibility that a fund would not receive an
adequate amount of financing upon the occurrence of an insolvency.
Expectedly, the states do not employ the same guidelines in the
management of their guaranty funds. In some states, assessments are
recouped by applying a surcharge to policies, 95 and in others, by
raising the premium taxes paid by policy holders." In addition, the
funds have limitations: not all states cover all types of insurance, 97
and some states have ceilings limiting any single guaranty fund payout.9" The result is that the same insurer's policy holders, if located
in different states, may be treated very differently in the event of an
insolvency. One may receive the full amount, or at least a portion of
the claim owed it through a guaranty fund allocation, while the other
may get nothing.
C. State Statutes
New York has provided that any organization or individual that
is subject to supervision under the New York Insurance law shall be
classified as an "insurer."" Organizations are subject to supervision
under the insurance law if they engage in business where they may
be "obligated to confer [a] benefit of pecuniary value upon another
party... dependent upon the happening of a fortuitous event in
which the ... beneficiary has, or is expected to have ... a material

92. See Insolvencies/Guaranty Funds, supra note 2, at 5-6. The actual figures were
$454.5 million paid out of an aggregate $2.4 billion (down from nearly $716 million in
1989). The guaranty funds of Maine and -Louisiana were exhausted. Id. at 6.
93. Id at 7.
94. Ia
95. Id This procedure is followed in New Jersey and California. Id
96. Id
97. For instance, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Louisiana, and New Jersey do not
have life or health insurance guaranty funds. Id.at 8.
98. I Colorado and Indiana will pay no-.more than $50,000. Oklahoma will pay a
maximum of $150,000. Rhode Island, on the other hand, will pay up to $1 million. Id
99. N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7401, 7408(b)(1) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1991).
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interest which will be adversely affected by the happening of such
event. ,, t' o
Conversely, Florida defines an insurer as "every person engaged
as indemnitor, surety, or contractor in the business of entering into
contracts of insurance or of annuity. " l' Insurance itself is "a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay or allow a
specified amount or a determinable benefit upon determinable contingencies." 1
The distinction here is critical, particularly with regard to the
threshold question of what entities constitute insurers. Health maintenance organizations are insurance companies under New York law,
but are considered as separate entities by Florida. 103 Thus, the insolvency of a New York health maintenance organization is not governed by the Federal Bankruptcy Code, but the insolvency of a Florida health maintenance organization is. 4
Once a state has identified an insolvent insurer, the state has
three options: (1) attempt to solve the problems through informal
"work-out" techniques; (2) .initiate formal regulatory actions; or (3)
commence rehabilitation or liquidation. The New York Superintendent
of Insurance may order the rehabilitation of an insurer if the insurer
is insolvent, 5 refuses to permit the Superintendent to investigate its
financial records," 4 is found to be in a condition which could "be
hazardous to its policyholders, creditors, or the public,""0 7 or has
engaged in illegal activities. After obtaining the order of insolvency, l"' the Superintendent assumes possession of the insurer and its

100. N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1991).
101. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.03 (West 1990).
102. 1&. § 624.02.
103. See id. § 624.04. The statutory definition of "person" does not include "health
maintenance organizations."
104. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 7401 (McKinney 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§

4307(d), 4310(c) (McKinney 1991).
105. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7402(a) (McKinney 1991). Insolvency occurs when an insurer "is
unable to pay its outstanding lawful obligations as they mature in the regular course of business, as shown by an excess of required reserves and other liabilities over admitted assets, or
by its not having sufficient assets to reinsure all outstanding risks with other solvent authorized assuming insurers after paying all accrued claims owed ....

"

N.Y. INS. LAW §

1309(a) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1991).
106.
107.

N.Y. INS. LAW § 7402(b) (McKinney 1991).
Id. § 7402(e). The term "hazardous" has been construed to encompass even the

regular rejection of claims and their subsequent settlement by an insurer for less than full
value. See, e.g., Caminetti v. Guaranty Union Life Ins. Co., 126 P.2d 159 (Cal. Ct. App.

1942).
108. The insurance company may appeal the Superintendent's order by filing, but the
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assets-usually consenting to the appointment of a conservator or
receiver until such time as the rehabilitation has been successfully
completed-and continues the insurer's business." 9 Unlike the conservator of a trust, the Superintendent, conservator or receiver is
clothed with great discretion in the handling of the insurer, and is not
required to obtain the consent of the court prior to transacting business. tt° However, the Superintendent's duty is merely to preserve
the status quo until the insurer is rehabilitated. Therefore, the Superintendent remains subject to the control of the court,' and parties in
interest can object to the Superintendent's actions during the pendency
of the rehabilitation."' If the Superintendent's actions are shown by
the petitioner to have been arbitrary or capricious, the court will
direct the Superintendent to cease and desist."3
Rehabilitation may be ordered for a Florida insurer if the insurer
is declared insolvent," 4 has withheld records," 5 is engaging in unlawful practices, 6 has failed to pay a final judgment rendered
against it,11 7 or is the victim of embezzlement,"' among other reasons."' Liquidation may be ordered for the same reasons." °
New York law provides that if the Superintendent is unsuccessful, or does not believe that a successful rehabilitation is possible, the

burden of proof is upon the company. In other words, the Superintendent's order bears a
presumption of propriety. See Caminetti, 126 P.2d at 159.
109. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7403(a) (McKinney 1991); see also Stewart v. Citizens Casualty
Co., 308 N.Y.S.2d 513 (App. Div.), af'd, 262 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y.), and cert. denied, 401 U.S.
910 (1970).
110. See, e.g., Lucas v. Manufacturing Lumberman's Underwriters, 163 S.W.2d 750 (Mo.
1942).
111. In re Application of the People of New York by Van Schaick, 268 N.Y.S. 88
(App. Div.), af'd, 191 N.E. 521 (N.Y. 1933); see also Powell v. All City Ins. Co., 426
N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Div. 1980).
112. See, e.g., Lucas, 163 S.W.2d at 750.
113. See, e.g., In re National Surety Co., 288 N.Y.S. 1014 (App. Div.), aft'd, 5 N.E.2d
358 (N.Y. 1936) (holding that the court should accord the insurer the highest degree of
discretion in carrying out its duty).
114. "Unable to pay its outstanding debts as they become due in the usual course of
business." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 631.011(9) (West 1990).
115. I § 631.051(5).
116. Id § 631.051(3).
117. I § 631.051(12). New York has no comparable provision.
118. Id § 631.051(13), The embezzlement must have been great enough to "threaten" the
corporation's solvency, but need not have actually caused an insolvency. The effect is that
even though the insurer is still able to pay its debts as they become due, and may have
purged the wrongdoer, it can be seized by the State.
119. See generally id § 631.051.
120. See id § 631.061.
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Superintendent may apply for an order allowing the liquidation of the
insurer (an attempt at rehabilitation is not a prerequisite to seeking an
order for liquidation). 121 The Superintendent must reinsure the insolvent company, and thereby safeguard its primary obligations with a
solvent domestic insurer that can absorb the additional policies.1 2 In
addition, the Superintendent may sell the property of the insolvent insured, subject to the approval of the court," 3 and must continue or
commence any litigation that the insolvent insured was or may have
been involved in if the recovery of additional assets for distribution to
creditors may be realized." 4
The remainder of Florida's rehabilitation and liquidation provisions are substantially similar to New York's, though not identical.1 25 Each state differs widely on the threshold question which determines the applicability of the statutory schemes: what constitutes an
insurer. Thus, though both states have adopted the Uniform Insurer's
Liquidation Act, 126 an entity in Florida may be entitled to take advantage of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, while an identical entity in
New York may be foreclosed from taking that advantage.
D. Claim Disposition
The insolvency of an insurer is considered to breach the insurer's
contracts of insurance,127 and the insured is deemed to be a creditor
12
for the value of its policy on the date of the insurer's dissolution. 1
If the insured has experienced a loss covered by its insurance prior to
the insolvency, the loss is still enforceable against a subsequently

121. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7404 (McKinney 1991). In addition, the Superintendent is the only
party who may act as the liquidator, as opposed to rehabilitation proceedings wherein the
Superintendent may consent to the appointment of a third party as receiver, see also In re
Lawyers Title & Guaranty Co., 5 N.Y.S.2d 484 (App. Div.), reh'g denied, 9 N.Y.S.2d 126
(App. Div. 1938).
122. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7405(c) (McKinney 1991). The insolvent insurer's "premium
reserve" is used to effectuate the reinsurance.
123.

See In re Lawyers Mortgage Co., 56 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1944).

124. See Kelly v. Overseas Investors, Inc., 219 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1966); Schenck v.
Coordinated Coverage Corp., 376 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1975).

125. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 631.281 (West 1990); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7427
(McKinney 1991) (offsets).

126. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., People v. Security Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 78
Caninetti v. Pacific Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 142 P.2d 741 (Cal. 1943).

N.Y. 114 (1879);

128. See People v. Commercial Alliance Life Ins. Co., 47 N.E. 968 (N.Y. 1897); Security
Life, 78 N.Y. at 114.
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insolvent insurer.129 However, the appointment of a receiver, or a
formal pronouncement of insolvency by the Superintendent as a prelude to liquidation, voids an insured's policy and negates claims made
subsequent to such a pronouncement.' ° Consequently, although an
insured may have a breach of contract claim for the value of the
policy on the date insolvency is declared, the insured does not have a
claim for the damages incurred as the result of any subsequent
loss. t3' In other words, if an insurer is declared insolvent and an
insured experiences a loss the next day, the insured may only recover
the value of the policy as of the date of the insolvency, and not the
amount of its claim.
Policyholders of the insurer may file proofs of claim at the commencement of the rehabilitation. 13 2 In New York for example,
claims are paid in the following order: (1) the actual costs incurred
during the insolvency proceedings; (2) debts due to employees; (3)
claims to creditors for goods or services contracted for within 90 days
of the insolvency; (4) claims to policyholders guaranteed by the Life
Insurance Company Guaranty Corporation of New York; (5) claims of
the federal or state government; (6) claims of general creditors; (7)
surplus or contribution notes or similar obligations; and finally, (8)
claims of policyholders' 33 The Superintendent may "compromise or
compound" any claim owed by the insurer under twenty-five hundred
dollars."' In other words, the Superintendent may eliminate such
claims or settle them for less than their full value. The court, however, not the Superintendent, determines whether a claim above that
amount shall be allowed or disallowed.'35 Nor is the Superintendent
obligated to pay interest on any claim when it is settled, unless the
original policy provided for the insolvency and the payment of inter136
est.

129. See State-Wide Ins. Co. v. Curry, 372 N.E.2d 31 (N.Y. 1977).
130. See, e.g., Hill v. Baker, 91 N.E. 380 (Mass. 1910); Withers v. Great American Nat.
Life Guardian, 200 A. 485 (N.J. 1938).
131. -See, e.g., Boston & A.R. Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 34 A. 778 (Md.
1896); Commonwealth v. Mass. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 119 Mass. 45 (1875).
132. See In re All City Ins. Co., 413 N.Y.S.2d 929 (App. Div. 1979).
133. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 7435 (McKinney 1991). Policyholders are considered unsecured creditors of the insurer.
134. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7428(b) (McKinney 1989).
135. In re National Surety Co., 36 N.E,2d 119 (N.Y. 1941).
136. See, e.g., Garrison v. Pacific Mut. Lif. Ins. Co., 187 P.2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
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V.

THE FEDERAL PROPOSAL

In response to the various criticisms of the state regulatory system and General Accounting Office recommendations that insurer
oversight be federalized, Senator Howard Metzenbaum introduced a
bill- "To create the Insurance Regulatory Commission" on August 2,
1991.137 The bill is designed to provide for federal regulation of all
interstate insurers.13 1 It would establish federal standards for insurance companies,1 39 as well as a national guaranty fund system,"
and would provide for the liquidation and insolvency of financially
troubled insurers.41
The Commission would consist of five commissioners, three from
one party and two from the other, to be appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate. 42 The Commission would "promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out its responsibilities"
under the Act. t43 Such rules would, in addition to the specific powers set forth above, include the power to investigate any entity in the
"business of insurance,"1" levy assessments upon insurers to pay
the Commission's expenses, 145 certify and examine state insurance
departments,"4 and examine and perform audits of insurance companies holding interstate insurance licenses.1 47 In order to carry out
these duties, the Commission would also be authorized to establish a
central depository for all insurance data it collects,148 as well as a
"Securities Valuation Office" to appraise the assets of state insurance

137. S. 1644, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
138. "Insurer" is defined as "the party to an insurance arrangement who undertakes to
indemnify for losses, provide pecuniary benefits or render services . . . ." Id § 104(b). "Insurance" is defined as "a contract whereby a person undertakes to indemnify another person
or to pay another person a specified amount upon determinable contingencies." Id § 104(c).
"Interstate Insurance" is defined as "a certification of authority .. . to do business in interstate commerce issued by a State which is accredited by the Insurance Regulatory Commission pursuant to the provisions of this title." Id. § 104(d).
139. Id § 201-20. An insurer which does not comply with these standards may be faced
with regulatory action. Id
140. Id § 401-13.
141. Id § 501-24.
142. Id § 101(a).
143. Id § 106.
144.

Id

§ 107(a).

145. Id § 108(a). Assessments would be levied in direct proportion to an insurer's
premiums. Id
146. Id §§ 109(a), 110.
147. Id § 111.
148.

Id

§ 112.
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1 49
departments and interstate insurers.

A.

Federal Minimum Standards

The federal bill would require an insurer to maintain a capital
reserve in order to ensure its stability based upon the specific nature
of its insurance business."5 In addition, specific standards would be
developed in order to enable state insurance departments to identify
insurers who are in precarious financial positions."
The federalization of financial requirements 5 2 would ensure
state uniformity in the investigation of multi-state insurers. Such uniformity should expedite regulatory examinations and help to alert
regulators to insurers experiencing difficulties. Although the bill does
not contain precise language indicating what the standards focus on, it
is probable that the submission of monthly or quarterly financial
statements to regulatory agencies would be required by the Commission.'
Frequent on-site audits of insurance companies would be
encouraged, and in order to ensure a higher degree of technical accuracy, state regulators would no doubt have to meet Commission standards and receive certification from the Commission."M
Certification of regulators and, more frequent audits of insurers
cannot be accomplished without additional funds. One of the purposes
of the assessments levied by the Commission upon insurers is to
provide such funds and ensure a greater depth to the resources of
state insurance departments.155 In order to further ensure an
insurer's financial well-being, financial investments considered dangerous by the Commission would be curtailed.'5 6 In addition, the bill
requires an insurer's investments to be "diversified," 57 and the
amount of risk an insurer could assume would be limited. 58 To further the goal of ensuring financial safety, the amount of "re-insur-

149. Id § 114.
150. d § 202.
151.

Id. § 204.

152. The NAIC already has such standards, but they are criticized as ineffective and
subject to uneven application by the states. See supra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
153. The bill does not speak to the frequency of submission, but does require that "the
Commission shall require annual audits" by independent certified public accountants. S. 1644,
102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 210(a) (1991).
154. See, e.g., id § 211.

155. See id § 219.
156, See id § 207.
157. Id § 207(a).
158. See id § 206.
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ance" that may be assumed by an insurer would be carefully regulated.159
B.

The National Insurance Guaranty Corporation

The National Insurance Guaranty Corporation ("NIGC") would be
a federal entity that would provide a uniform national system for the
payment and administration for the rehabilitation and liquidation of
insolvent member insurers."6 The NIGC would establish national
guaranty funds for the separate lines of insurance 6 1 maintained by
assessments contributed from member insurers. 6 2 The fund would
be used in order to pay the claims of any insolvent insurer.163
C. The Liquidation of Insolvent Insurers
The proposed bill expressly preempts the states from supervising
the liquidation of NIGC member insurers and places that power solely
within the NIGC.'" The state insurance department would file a petition seeking to appoint the NIGC as receiver of the insolvent corporation with any United States District Court. 65 The NIGC would be
empowered to accept the appointment or reject the appointment if the
subject insurer were not a member of the NIGC at the time the petition was filed.'" The NIGC would then take possession of the insurer and its assets, and would thereby become subject to claims
against the insurer from the date of the petition forward. 67
The filing of a petition would "operate as a stay of the commencement or continuation of any action or proceeding, in any State
or Federal court, or any administrative proceeding, against the insolvent insurer."' ' The stay, in contrast to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, could be lifted by the court if such action was "consistent with the preservation of assets and the efficient administration of
the estate of the insurer."' 169 Thus, the Insurance Rehabilitation Act
159. See id § 301-13.
160. See S. 1644, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1991). Member insurers would consist of
any "insurer which has an interstate insurance license." 1I § 402(a).
161. Comprised of life, health, and property/casualty insurance. See id § 404b).
162. See id § 405(a).
163. See id § 405(c).
164. See id § 501.

165. See i § 503.
166. See id § 503(d).

167. See id § 505.
168. Id § 507(a).
169. Id § 507(b); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1991), which provides that:
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would protect policy holders at the expense of general creditors: the
language of the statute provides that it is not the damage to the creditor which will determine whether relief from the stay is granted.
Rather, the insured, and by extension the policyholders, take priority.170 Because of the slight risk of insolvency, even in these difficult times, and the existence of the national guaranty fund, this provision is not likely to have a strong impact upon insurers and general
creditors in the normal course of business.
As liquidator, the NIGC would have the power to hire such
personnel as is necessary to conduct the liquidation,'"' to appoint a
committee of creditors, 72 and to audit the insurer.' 73 Moreover,
the corporation would have the power to collect debts owed to the
insurer,"74 to sell the property of the insurer, t75 to pursue claims
against the insurer t76 and to review, allow and disallow claims
against the insurer. 77 The corporation would promulgate rules providing for the submission and proofs of claim,7917' and would pay
claims against the insurer as soon as practicable.
The bill contains a three-year period in which transfers by the
insurer may be considered fraudulent and can be avoided by the
liquidator.8 0 The lengthy time period, far exceeding that of 11
U.S.C. § 548, is further evidence that the bill is designed, in large

the court shall grant relief from the stay . . . (1) for cause, including the lack of
adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest; or [if] . . .
(a) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and (b) such property is
not necessary to an effective reorganization.
14
170. The provision could be read as eliminating the first prong of 11 U.s.C § 362(d),
providing that a creditor may gain relief if lacking "adequate protection." The new bill
merely focuses on whether the insurer may need the property or the property would be
necessary for distribution to creditors and policy holders as a whole, in contrast to distribution to one individual creditor.
171. S. 1644, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 511(a)(1) (1991).
172. See ide§ 511(a)(2). Contra 11 U.S.C. § 705 (1991) (providing that unsecured
creditors may elect their own committees).
173. S. 1644, 102d Cong., 1st Seass. § 511(a)(3) (1991).
174. JL § 511(a)(4).
175. Ia § 511(a)(5).
176. Id.§ 511(a)(6).
177. Id § 511(a)(8).
178. L § 513.
179. Id § 514.
180. Defined as "[e]very transfer made and every obligation incurred by an insurer within
three years prior to the filing of a successful petition for liquidation . . . is fraudulent as to
then existing and future creditors if made or incurred without fair consideration, or with
actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud either existing or future creditors.- L § 516(a).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss3/5

26

Hodkin: Insurer Insolvency: Problems & Solutions

1992]

Insurer Insolvency

part, to provide policyholders with the extra protection necessary for
people in their uniquely disadvantaged position.
Preferences are also construed broadly under the proposed act.
The act permits the avoidance of any transfer made within one year
of liquidation, unless the insurer was already subject to rehabilitation
at the time the liquidation order was entered into, in which case
transfers made within two years may be avoided.181
The proposed bill does not address the question of whether payments to an insured could be considered preferential in the event the
insurer is subsequently adjudicated insolvent. However, it is not likely
that the bill will exit the committee hearings without addressing the
preference provision, or that the courts would construe the statute in
such a way as to find that payments to an insured prior to an insolvency should be voided as preferences. The basis for this conclusion
is threefold:
(1) The bill prefers policyholders of the insured to general creditors.182 The preference provision is obviously directed at creditors,
and to enforce it against bona fide policyholders would undermine the
greater purpose of the statute: to protect policyholders in the event of
an insolvency. Therefore, even if the bill were not amended in committee, courts should construe the preference provision to permit
payments to the policyholders.
(2) If courts uphold pre-insolvency payments to insured parties,
insurers may discriminate amongst policyholders. These policyholders
can be divided into three classes: (a) policyholders whose claims are
judged as valid by the insurer, (b) policyholders whose claims are
declined in good faith (the judgment of which is probably disputed
by the policyholder and, presumably, will be judicially determined),
and (c) policyholders who receive improper preferential treatment
from the insurer.
The claims paid in good faith are presumptively valid. Those
policyholders may require their insurance payments immediately, and
may suffer further, irreparable harm if they are not compensated
immediately. Payments to those policyholders cannot truly be characterized as preferential or harmful to the other policyholders: the insurer could not have been seeking to receive future benefits from the
payment (other than possibly seeking to maintain public confidence in
the event of a successful rehabilitation, but the claim probably would

181. See id § 517(a).
182. See supra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
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have been paid in that event anyway), and was, but for the insolvency, obligated to pay the policyholder. This is not true in the case of
general creditors who may subsequently provide the insurer with
special treatment. Thus, the essential purpose of the voidable preference rule is not present in the case of bona fide claims, whereas it
would remain in the case of general creditors.
(3) Claims paid to policyholders in bad faith are really fraudulent
transfers, not preferential payments. The payments generally do not
bear the indicia of a preference: although the payment does prefer
these policyholders to those whose claims are declined, the payment
is not made in order to prefer the payee over other policyholders for
future purposes. Rather, the payment would probably be for fraudulent
purposes. Moreover, such a characterization is more advantageous to
policyholders in general because of the longer period during which
the NIGC can avoid fraudulent transfers. Finally, an equitable reason
exists for seeking the return of bad faith payments which does not
exist in the case of bona fide payments: the former policyholder
should never have been paid, whereas the latter policyholder has
suffered a real injury for which compensation is necessary.
The final difficulty in this area concerns bona fide claim holders
whose pre-insolvency claims were disputed by the insurer and enter
litigation or extra-judicial settlement proceedings. The present language of the automatic stay provision bars the continuation of such
proceedings, and therefore disadvantages these policyholders vis a vis
policyholders whose claims are expeditiously paid. The automatic stay
provision of the bill should therefore be amended to permit any policyholder whose claim arose prior to the insolvency to either continue
or commence litigation with the NIGC after an appropriate time period (long enough for the NIGC to take possession of the insurer).
The recommended adjustments to the bill would prevent policyholders who have suffered a bona fide injury from being further impaired by an avoidance of a subsequent payment on their claim. Policyholders whose claims arise within a period immediately following
the insolvency (i.e., two to three weeks) could also be permitted to
pursue their claims. Such a "grace period" would provide these policyholders with coverage, yet protect the insurer from continuing
claims by compelling policyholders to obtain re-insurance elsewhere.
Subsequent claims generally would not have received compensation
until the liquidation or rehabilitation was concluded. By permitting the
continuation of the suit, these policyholders will receive what amounts
to a more advantageous claim distribution position, thereby limiting
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the "preferential effect" of the payments.
The bill's current distribution scheme provides for seven classes
of distribution, in the following order: (1) reimbursement to the corporation for expenses incurred during the liquidation; (2) reasonable
compensation to employees of the insurer; (3) all claims to policyholders; (4) unearned premium refunds; (5) claims of general creditors; (6) claims of the federal or local governments; (7) late claims;
1 83
(8) surplus or contribution notes; and (9) claims of stockholders.
The federal bill is much more favorable to policyholders than, for
example, the New York distribution scheme. i 4
The liquidation procedures of the proposed bill, while favorable
to policyholders, are not as important as the new regulatory procedures which the bill would establish for the supervision and administration of multi-state insurers. The bill eliminates many of the problems caused by state supervision, and its passage would eliminate the
uncertainties concerning which entities are insurance companies. In
short, passage of the bill would strengthen the insurance regulation
industry as well as expedite insolvency proceedings should an insurer
fail.
The bill has been criticized on the grounds that it will prove to
be no better than federal provisions for the supervision of the savings
and loan industry." 5 However, the insurance regulatory bill provides
for much greater federal regulation than the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act or the Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Enforcement
Act."8 6 An accompanying House of Representatives bill, "The Insurance Fraud Prevention Act of 1991," seeks to eliminate much of the
fraud and corruption that existed in the savings and loan industry and
in the state insurance regulatory industry.'87
VI.

CONCLUSION

The current system of federal deference to state insurance regulation, created by the § 109(b)(2) exclusion of insurance companies
from the purview of the Bankruptcy Code, is largely ineffective in

183. See id, § 520.
184. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
185. See Adriene Locke, Regulators Faulted; GAO Says Solvency Monitoring Lax, BUS.
INS., Dec. 11, 1989, at 2.
186. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1441a(b)(1)(C), 1441a(b)(4), 1441a(b)(6), et. seq. (West Supp.
1991) (also known as "FIRREA").
187. See H.R. 3171, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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the case of multi-state insurers and is detrimental to policyholders.
The threshold question of what constitutes an insurance company,
necessary for determining the applicability of the § 109(b)(2) exclusion, is difficult and has led to mercurial results in the resolution of
proceedings involving substantially similar entities. This dispaiity of
treatment is also present in the actual liquidation and regulation of
multi-state insurers.
The proposed federal system would remove many problems inherent within the state regulatory system. Inclusion of multi-state insurers within a federal rehabilitation and liquidation scheme would
eliminate the confusion over what entities are considered to be insurance companies, and eliminate the inequitable treatment currently
afforded to policyholders in similar and often related entities. The
inclusion of multi-state insurers into federal law should be promoted
and supported in order to extend the protection and consistency of
federal bankruptcy law to insurance companies.
'Adam Hodkin
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